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To  broaden  the  measurement  of  intolerance  of  uncertainty  (IU)  beyond  self-report  methods,  recent
research  has  examined  the  Beads  Task  as a behavioral  measure  of  IU.  In the  present  study,  we  enhanced
this  task  to increase  its ecological  validity  by maximizing  decisional  uncertainty  and  the  importance  of  a
correct  response.  Undergraduate  participants  (n =  102)  completed  the  Beads  Task  with  instructions  that
they would  complete  the  Cold Pressor  Task  (CPT)  if they  answered  incorrectly.  As hypothesized,  baseline





during  the  decision-making  process.  Furthermore,  in  vivo  Beads  Task  distress  was associated  with  self-
report inhibitory  IU, which  measures  avoidance  and  paralysis  in  the  face  of  uncertainty,  but  not  with
prospective  IU, perfectionism,  or general  psychological  distress  after  making  statistical  adjustments  for
multiple  comparisons.  Comparisons  to previous  work  using  the  Beads  Task,  clinical  implications,  and
avenues  for  future  research  are  discussed.
© 2016  Elsevier  Ltd. All  rights  reserved.. Introduction
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a cognitive bias that affects
ow a person experiences, interprets, and responds to situations
hat are ambiguous or have indefinite outcomes (Dugas, Schwartz,
 Francis, 2004; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group
OCCWG], 1997). IU involves both prospective (i.e., discomfort due
o future unknowns) and inhibitory (i.e., avoidance and paralysis in
he face of ambiguity) components (Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, &
reeston, 2011; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007; McEvoy &
ahoney, 2011). Individuals who are high in IU tend to (a) have
 lower perceptual threshold of ambiguity, (b) make threatening
nterpretations of ambiguous information, (c) find uncertainty to be
istressing, unmanageable, and something that should be avoided,
nd (d) have difficulty functioning in uncertain or ambiguous sit-
ations (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008; Buhr & Dugas, 2002;
rohne, 1993; Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997).IU is also a transdiagnostic vulnerability factor for the
evelopment of anxiety and related disorders (Boswell, Thompson-
ollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013; Carleton, 2012; Carleton,
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887-6185/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Mulvogue et al., 2012; Einstein, 2014). It is associated with symp-
toms of OCD (e.g., Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003), GAD
(e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 2006), panic disorder (e.g., Carleton et al., 2014),
health anxiety (e.g., Fergus & Valentiner, 2011), and social phobia
(e.g., Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). In fact, IU predicts anxiety symp-
toms above and beyond other cognitive vulnerability factors such as
anxiety sensitivity, distress tolerance, and trait anxiety (Norr et al.,
2013). Indeed, many behaviors observed in these conditions (e.g.,
safety behaviors, reassurance seeking, rumination, compulsions,
avoidance) can be conceptualized as attempts to obtain certainty
and reduce anxious arousal (e.g., Behar, DiMarco, Hekler, Mohlman,
& Staples, 2009; Einstein, 2014; Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006).
An important limitation of the existing research on IU, how-
ever, is that studies rely almost exclusively on self-report measures,
such as the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS-12; Carleton et al.,
2007) and the Perfectionism/Certainty subscale of the Obsessive
Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-PC; OCCWG, 2005). Although there is
strong evidence for the construct validity of these instruments, the
literature would benefit from methodologically varied measure-
ment of this cognitive bias. Specifically, these questionnaires are
limited in that they are trait measures, which merely capture par-
ticipants’ self-reported stable beliefs about uncertainty. They do
not, however, lend themselves well to use as dependent variables
in studies seeking to examine predictors and moderators of state IU
(i.e., feelings of IU-related distress captured in the moment). Some
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easures of IU, by quantifying the relationship between self-report
U and performance on behavioral tasks involving uncertainty or
mbiguity (e.g., decisions made during a laboratory gambling task;
uhmann, Ishida, & Hajcak, 2011). These tasks have the advantage
f experimentally inducing uncertainty in the laboratory and cap-
uring participants’ cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses
o actual ambiguous scenarios.
One such behavioral measure is the Beads Task (Huq, Garety, &
emsley, 1988; Phillips & Edwards, 1966), utilized by three studies
o date to examine how performance on this task may  be related to
U. The Beads Task is a probabilistic inference task in which partic-
pants are shown two jars on a computer screen. Each jar contains
00 beads of two different colors in a particular ratio (e.g., 85:15
ed beads to blue beads vs. 85:15 blue to red). Participants are told
hat beads will be drawn one by one with replacement from one
f the jars (the sequence of beads is predetermined using a ran-
om number generator), and that each jar is equally likely to be
hosen. The participant’s task is to determine from which jar the
eads are being drawn (e.g., the mostly red jar or the mostly blue
ar). Participants are told that they can request as many beads as
ecessary to correctly decide. Outcome measures include: (a) the
umber of beads requested before feeling “certain” about making a
ecision (i.e., draws to decision; DTD), (b) the time taken to decide,
nd (c) self-reported distress during the task. IU is expected to be
ssociated with greater DTD, time to decision, and distress.
Ladouceur et al. (1997) found a positive association between
cores on the IUS and DTD using a non-clinical sample; yet a sep-
rate team was unable to replicate this finding in a sample of
articipants with eating disorders (Sternheim, Startup, & Schmidt,
011). Neither study, however, assessed relationships between
elf-reported IU and time to decision or in vivo distress. Thus, using
 sample of individuals diagnosed with anxiety disorders, Jacoby,
bramowitz, Buck, and Fabricant (2014) found that self-reported IU
s measured by the OBQ-PC was correlated with DTD and distress
uring the Beads Task. Furthermore, the distress variable distin-
uished individuals with anxiety disorders from healthy controls.
Jacoby et al. (2014) also raised two issues necessitating further
nvestigation of the Beads Task as a viable paradigm for studying IU.
irst, IU, in the context of anxiety disorders, typically focuses on the
ossibility of a feared negative consequence (Nelson & Shankman,
011). However, the ecological validity of the Beads Task was  lim-
ted in that there were no meaningful negative consequences for an
ncorrect response. Accordingly, this may  explain why  participants
elf-reported relatively little distress while completing the task.
econd, because the OBQ-PC, used in Jacoby et al. (2014), assesses
oth IU and perfectionism, it is important to clarify the extent to
hich each construct might be uniquely associated with outcomes
n the Beads Task.
Accordingly, the present study aimed to enhance the ecolog-
cal validity of the Beads Task as an analog for how individuals
ith anxiety disorders manage uncertainty. Specifically, we  sought
o heighten the importance of a correct response (and corre-
ponding in vivo distress) by introducing the threat of an aversive
utcome—the Cold Pressor Task (CPT; submerging one’s dominant
and in a cooler of ice water for as long as is tolerable; described in
ection 2.3). All participants completed the CPT prior to the Beads
ask, and were informed they would have to repeat the CPT if they
uessed the incorrect jar. We  also maximized uncertainty of the
ecision by using a completely ambiguous version of the Beads Task
ith 50/50 probabilistic ratios. We  hypothesized that: (a) lower
aseline CPT endurance time (i.e., seconds immersed in the cold
ater) and higher self-reported pain levels after completing the
PT would be associated with more DTD, time to decision, and dis-
ress during the Beads Task, and (b) Beads Task outcomes would
e positively associated with self-reported IU. We also included a
easure of perfectionism and a general measure of psychological Disorders 41 (2016) 43–49
distress in order to explore the extent to which these constructs
related to Beads Task outcomes.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
One-hundred and ten undergraduate students recruited from
Introduction to Psychology classes at the University of North Car-
olina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) participated in this study. Eight
participants were removed for the following reasons: (a) they pro-
vided information during debriefing suggesting that they knew
they would not need to put their hand back in the ice water or
that they would simply refuse to do so if asked (n = 3), (b) they told
the researcher that they were looking forward to repeating the CPT
(and thus did not perceive the paradigm to be aversive, n = 3), (c)
they shared that they did not understand the rules of the Beads
Task (n = 1), and (d) the experimenters noted that the participant
seemed to rush through the procedures (n = 1). Accordingly, the
final sample size for data analysis was 102.
The sample was primarily female (61.8%, n = 63), White (77.5%,
n = 79; 6.9% Black or African American, 7.8% Asian, 3.9% bi- or multi-
racial, and 3.9% other), non-Latino (94.1%, n = 96), right-handed
(88.2%, n = 90), and first-year students (66.7%, n = 68; 16.7% sopho-
more, 10.8% junior, 5.9% senior) with a mean age of 18.93 years old
(SD = 1.14; range 17–22); which is comparable to the demograph-
ics of our Introduction to Psychology participant pool at large. Due
to the use of the Beads Task and CPT, the following exclusion crite-
ria were present for the study: (1) being color-blind, (2) history of
hypertension, peripheral vascular disease, cold urticaria, cold sen-
sitivity, or Raynauds syndrome, and (3) open cuts or lesions on the
hands.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, short form (IUS-12;
Carleton et al., 2007)
The IUS-12 is a shortened version of the original 27-item
IUS (Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, & Dugas, 1994) that measures
reactions to uncertainty, ambiguity, and the future. The measure
consists of two subscales: (a) Prospective IU measures desire for pre-
dictability, preferences for knowing what the future holds, anxiety
about future uncertain events, and active engagement in seeking
information to increase certainty (e.g., “I always want to know what
the future has in store for me”), and (b) Inhibitory IU measures
avoidance and paralysis in the face of uncertainty (e.g., “When I
am uncertain I can’t function very well”). Participants rate each
item from 1 (Not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (Entirely char-
acteristic of me). The IUS-12 has good psychometric properties in
both clinical and non-clinical samples (Carleton, Mulvogue et al.,
2012; Carleton et al., 2007; Helsen, Van, Vlaeyen, & Goubert, 2013;
Jacoby, Fabricant, Leonard, Riemann, & Abramowitz, 2013; Khawaja
& Yu, 2010; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). Internal consistency of
the IUS-12 subscales in the present sample was good to excellent
(  ̨ = 0.85–0.90).
2.2.2. Frost Multi-Dimensional Perfectionism Scale (FMPS-22;
Cox, Enns, & Clara, 2002)
The FMPS-22 is a revised version of the original 35-item FMPS
(Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990) assessing multiple
dimensions of perfectionism including: concerns over making mis-
takes (e.g., “If I fail partly, it is as bad as being a complete failure”),
doubts about actions (e.g., “I tend to get behind in my work because
I repeat things over and over”), high personal standards (e.g., “I set
higher goals for myself than most people”), high parental expecta-
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ess than perfectly”), and organization (e.g., “I am an organized per-
on”). Participants rate each item on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
rom 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The FMPS-22 has
ood psychometric properties in clinical and non-clinical samples,
emonstrating construct validity and strong associations with the
riginal FMPS (Cox et al., 2002). Internal consistency of the FMPS-22
n the present sample was good (  ̨ = 0.87).
.2.3. Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Antony,
ieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)
The DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report measure of general psycho-
ogical distress containing three seven-item subscales: Depression
DASS-D; i.e.,  dysphoric mood), Anxiety (DASS-A; i.e.,  physical
rousal, panic attacks, and fear); and Stress (DASS-S; i.e.,  tension,
rritability, agitation, and overreaction to stressful events). Partic-
pants rate items on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (Did
ot apply to me at all)  to 3 (Applied to me  very much, or most of the
ime) and then total scores are multiplied by 2 in order to compare
o full scale DASS-42 scores. The DASS-21 has an excellent factor
tructure, and the subscales have good to excellent internal consis-
ency (Antony et al., 1998). It also has good convergent and known
roups validity. Internal consistency of the DASS subscales in the
resent sample was good (  ̨ = 0.74–0.88).
.2.4. Beads Task (Huq et al., 1988; Phillips & Edwards, 1966)
The Beads Task used in the current study consisted of three com-
uterized versions of the task, each containing 2 jars with 50:50
robabilistic ratios. The maximum possible number of beads that
ould be requested before making a decision was 50. The sequences
f beads in the three conditions were determined using a random
umber generator and are listed below.
Version 1: 50 Purple (P):50 Green (G)
GPPGPPGPGGGPGGPGGGPGGGPGGPGPPPPGGPPGPGGPPGG-
PPGPPG
Version 2: 50 Red (R):50 Blue (B)
RBRRBBRBBRBRBRBBRRBRRBRBBRBRRBRRBBRBRBRR-
RBRRBBBRR
Version 3: 50 Pink (P):50 Yellow (Y)
PYPYPPYYYPYYPYYPYPPYPPYPYPPYPYYPYYPYPYYPYPY-
PYPYPY
Because of the possibility of memory biases and deficits (e.g.,
eckersbach, Otto, Savage, Baer, & Jenike, 2000), and decreased
emory confidence in some anxiety disorders (e.g., Tolin et al.,
001), all participants were able to see the beads from previous
rials displayed at the bottom of their computer screen in order to
liminate any possible influence of memory on the Beads Task.
The experimenter recorded: (a) the number of beads the par-
icipant selected before making a decision (i.e.,  DTD), (b) time
aken to reach the decision, and (c) the participant’s decision itself
i.e., which jar they thought the beads were coming from). Before
earning whether or not they answered correctly, participants also
ompleted a series of three questions (at the end of each version of
he task) using a visual analog scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (Not at
ll) to 100 (Very much). The questions were: (a) “How certain are
ou about your decision?”, (b) “How distressed do you feel in this
oment?”, and (c) “How important is it for you to get the answer
ight and avoid having to put your hand in the ice water?” (which
as used to check that participants were engaged in the task).
.3. ProcedureThe study was described to all participants as a one-hour experi-
ent investigating “decision-making.” Participants were informed
hat they would be asked to answer questions on the computer
bout thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and that they would Disorders 41 (2016) 43–49 45
complete a “cold water challenge” and a computer-based decision-
making task with the help of the experimenter.
All participants were tested individually in the laboratory. The
experimenter first obtained informed consent. Using the computer
program Qualtrics, participants then completed a demographic sur-
vey and the study measures described above. Next, participants
completed the CPT, which is one of the most common experimen-
tal methods of pain induction (e.g., Franklin et al., 2010; Klatzkin,
Mechlin, Bunevicius, & Girdler, 2007; Russ et al., 1992). Participants
were asked to submerge their dominant hand (up to the wrist) in
a cooler of 5 ◦C ice water (M = 5.24◦, SD = 0.99). A water circulator
attached inside the cooler maintained an even distribution of the
water temperature (and prevented the water near the participant’s
hand from warming up). Participants were instructed to remove
their hand from the water when the pain became “too intense for
you to take” and to rate their discomfort/pain level on a scale from
0 (No pain or discomfort)  to 10 (Worst pain/discomfort you can imag-
ine) at that time. Experimenters recorded the time latency from CPT
onset until the participant removed his or her hand (referred to as
“endurance time”), a commonly-used measure of pain tolerance
(e.g., Klatzkin et al., 2007; Mechlin, Morrow, Maixner, & Girdler,
2007). Participants were allowed to keep their hand in the water for
a maximum of two minutes (after which point the hand becomes
numb from the ice water).
Finally, after completing a practice version of the Beads Task
(in order to learn the rules), participants completed three different
experimental versions of the task (in a counterbalanced order) in
the presence of an experimenter (as this has been found to increase
reliability of the task; Fear & Healy, 1997). Participants were not
informed of the ratio of beads inside the jar, and were misled to
believe that there was one jar filled with beads that are mostly
one color and a second jar filled with beads that are mostly the
other color (e.g., a mostly purple jar vs. a mostly green jar). The
experimenter also emphasized the importance of answering cor-
rectly. Participants were told that if they answered incorrectly, they
would have to re-submerge their hand in the ice water for 20 s,
plus 2 additional seconds for every bead they chose while making
their decision (the amount of time was  tracked on the computer
screen). On the other hand, if they guessed correctly, participants
were told they would not have to re-submerge their hand in the
ice water at all. Participants were explicitly instructed to consider
the tradeoff between the number of beads they chose to see and
their accuracy as they were deciding. In reality, since there was no
right or wrong answer (e.g., the jar was actually filled with 50% pur-
ple beads and 50% green beads), after completing each Beads Task
version and responding to the follow-up questions, all participants
were informed that they answered correctly on all three experi-
mental versions of the task, and thus no participants repeated the
CPT.
At the end of the visit, participants were debriefed and informed
of the mild deception involved in the study. In exchange for their
participation, participants received one hour of credit toward the
research requirement of Introduction to Psychology.
2.4. Data analysis plan
We used the following statistical approach to test our hypothe-
ses. We first computed descriptive statistics for our self-report
measures of cognitions (IUS-12 subscales and FMPS-22) and symp-
toms (DASS subscales), as well as CPT and Beads Task outcomes.
Next, we  computed Pearson’s correlations between CPT and Beads
Task outcome variables as a manipulation check to determine the
extent to which experiences with the CPT were associated with
subsequent Beads Task performance. Finally, in order to test our
primary hypotheses, we  calculated Pearson’s correlations between
the primary Beads Task outcome variables (i.e.,  DTD, time to deci-
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Table  1
Means and standard deviations on study measures (n = 102).
Mean (SD) Range Skewness Kurtosis
IUS-12
Prospective IU 18.48 (5.51) 9–33 0.52 −0.21
Inhibitory IU 9.33 (4.19) 5–22 1.15 0.80
FMPS-22 63.88 (13.29) 35–109 0.43 0.71
DASS-21a
Depression 6.22 (7.37) 0–36 0.54 0.27
Anxiety 5.10 (5.77) 0–28 0.21 −0.78
Stress 10.31 (7.78) 0–42 −0.34 0.20
CPT
Endurance time (s) 52.69 (34.90) 7–120 0.92 −0.47
Pain  level (0−10) 7.08 (1.62) 2–10 −1.00 1.17
Beads Task
DTD (0−50) 20.77 (13.70) 3–50 0.90 −0.29
Time to decision (s)a 43.49 (36.28) 9–250 0.34 −0.07
Distress (0−100) 33.65 (20.83) 0–94 0.64 0.34
Importance (0−100) 47.42 (24.11) 0–100 0.12 −0.52
Certainty (0−100) 46.46 (17.17) 3–98 0.01 0.10
Note: IUS-12—Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12; FMPS-22—Frost Multi-
Dimensional Perfectionism Scale-22; DASS-21—Depression Anxiety and Stress
Scale-21; CPT—Cold Pressor Task; DTD—draws to decision




































Correlations between CPT and Beads Task performance (n = 102).
CPT endurance time CPT pain level
Beads Task
DTD 0.09 0.06




distress levels during the Beads Task only remained weakly
positively associated with inhibitory IU scores at the Bonferroni
corrected alpha level.alues; skewness and kurtosis for these variables are for the square root- and log-
ransformed values respectively. All subsequent analyses involving these measures
sed  transformed values.
ion, distress) and the self-report cognition and symptom measures
o examine how trait levels of IU, perfectionism, and general psy-
hological distress were related to in vivo Beads Task performance.
. Results
.1. Means on study measures
.1.1. Self-report measures
Means, standard deviations, range, skewness, and kurtosis val-
es for the self-report measures of symptoms and cognitions
ppear in Table 1. The sample’s mean and range on these mea-
ures were comparable to those from previous studies using
ndergraduate samples (Berman, Stark, Ramsey, Cooperman, &
bramowitz, 2014; Carleton et al., 2007). The distributions of the
ASS subscale scores were somewhat positively skewed (skew-
ess: DASS-Depression = 2.13, DASS-Anxiety: 1.59, DASS-Stress:
.14) and platykurtic (kurtosis: DASS-Depression = 4.90, DASS-
nxiety: 2.94, DASS-Stress: 1.97). As a result, we square root
ransformed the DASS subscales, which resulted in a more sym-
etric distribution. None of these other measures displayed
roblematic levels of skewness or kurtosis (Tabachnick & Fidell,
013).
.1.2. Cold Pressor Task outcomes
Table 1 also contains descriptive information about participant
erformance on the CPT. On average, participants kept their hand in
he ice water for almost a minute (with a wide range of individual
erformances). Participants also found the ice water to be fairly
ainful and uncomfortable.
.1.3. Beads Task outcomes
Decisions on the Beads Task were evenly distributed for Ver-
ion 1 (49% purple vs. 51% green) and Version 2 (52.9% red vs.
7.1% blue), but less so for Version 3 (77.5% yellow vs. 22.5% pink).
ince the sequence of beads for all 3 versions was generated using
 random number generator in order to represent 50:50 proba-
ilistic ratios, and because primary outcomes (i.e., DTD, time to
ecision, distress) were comparable across the three task versions,Note: CPT—Cold Pressor Task; DTD—draws to decision.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.005 (Bonferroni corrected).
we averaged performance on the three versions for subsequent
analyses. See Table 1 for average performance outcomes on the
Beads Task. Participants indicated feeling relatively uncertain of
their decision (i.e., close to 50/50). They stated that it was mod-
erately important to answer correctly, and that they were mildly
to moderately distressed by the task. The distribution of Beads
Task decision time was positively skewed (skewness = 2.85) and
platykurtic (kurtosis = 11.66). As a result, we log transformed deci-
sion time, which resulted in a more symmetric distribution.
3.2. Associations between CPT and Beads Task performance
3.2.1. Preliminary analyses
CPT water temperature ranged from 2 to 8 ◦C. Pearson’s corre-
lations indicated that water temperature was positively associated
with CPT endurance time, r(102) = 0.20, p = 0.04, but not with pain
level r(102) = −0.01, p = 0.96.1
3.2.2. Pearson’s correlations.
We then conducted Pearson’s correlations between CPT per-
formance (endurance time and pain level) and Beads Task
performance (see Table 2). As can be seen, less time with one’s hand
in the ice water and more distress reported during the CPT were
each associated with greater distress and greater perceived impor-
tance of answering correctly on the Beads Task. This suggests that
experiences with the CPT were indeed associated with subsequent
Beads Task performance. A Bonferroni corrected alpha of 0.005
was used to correct for multiple tests (0.05/10). The association
between CPT pain level and Beads Task importance did not survive
Bonferroni correction; all other associations remained significant.
3.3. Associations between Beads Task performance and
self-report measures
3.3.1. IU and other cognitive variables
We computed Pearson’s correlations between the
primary Beads Task variables (i.e.,  DTD, time to
decision, distress) and the self-report cognition measures (IUS-12
subscales and FMPS-22; see Table 3). Self-reported distress levels
during the Beads Task were weakly positively associated with
prospective and inhibitory IU scores as well as perfectionism. No
other correlations were significant. A Bonferroni corrected alpha of
0.006 was used to correct for multiple tests (0.05/9). Self-reported1 Given this significant association between CPT performance and water temper-
ature, we conducted additional partial correlations corresponding to the analyses
that follow controlling for CPT water temperature. The same pattern of results was
observed; thus, the more parsimonious simple correlations are reported in this
manuscript.
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Table  3
Correlations between Beads Task performance and self-report measures (n = 102).
DTD Time to decision Distress
Cognitions
Prospective IU −0.06 −0.09 0.20*
Inhibitory IU −0.03 0.09 0.29**
FMPS-22 0.13 0.13 0.24*
Symptoms
DASS-D −0.23* −0.03 0.06
DASS-A −0.08 0.01 0.08
DASS-S −0.04 0.10 0.17
Note: IU—intolerance of uncertainty; FMPS-22—Frost Multi-Dimensional Perfec-














































* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.006 (Bonferroni corrected).
.3.2. Symptoms
We  computed Pearson’s correlations between the primary
eads Task variables and the subscales of the DASS. DASS-
epression was weakly negatively associated with DTD. No other
orrelations were significant. A Bonferroni corrected alpha of 0.006
as used to correct for multiple tests (0.05/9). The association
etween DASS-Depression and DTD was no longer significant after
onferroni correction.
. Discussion
The current study aimed to evaluate an updated version of the
eads Task as a behavioral measure of IU. We  developed the current
ersion of the task to be more ecologically valid relative to previ-
us versions (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2014), and indeed, the use of 50/50
robabilistic ratios in our study resulted in participants reporting
eeling relatively uncertain after having decided. We  also paired the
PT with the Beads Task to heighten task importance and related
istress; and indeed, perceived importance of answering correctly
47.42 vs. 32.83 out of 100) and ratings of task distress (33.65 vs.
.99 out of 100) were both elevated in the current study relative to
ndergraduate participants who completed the Beads Task with-
ut the CPT in Jacoby et al. (2014). Furthermore, our manipulation
heck revealed that lower CPT endurance time and higher CPT pain
evels were associated with greater distress and perceived impor-
ance during the Beads Task. In concert, these findings suggest that
dding the CPT as an aversive future outcome that participants wish
o avoid amplified distress during the Beads Task decision-making
rocess.
More central to the purpose of this study, in vivo distress expe-
ienced during the Beads Task was associated with self-report
nhibitory IU, but not with prospective IU, perfectionism, or gen-
ral psychological distress after making statistical adjustments for
ultiple comparisons (i.e.,  Bonferroni corrections). Inhibitory IU
efers to avoidance and paralysis in the face of uncertainty (e.g.,
When I am uncertain I can’t function very well” and “The small-
st doubt stops me  from acting”) and is considered to be the more
ehaviorally focused dimension of IU. Thus, the fact that Beads Task
istress is uniquely associated with inhibitory IU, but not prospec-
ive IU, suggests that this task may  be capturing anxiety due to
aralysis while attempting to make an uncertain decision. The find-
ng that distress on the Beads Task was associated with IU, but not
erfectionism, is important given that uncertainty and perfection-
sm are overlapping constructs (e.g., OCCWG, 2005), and clarifies
he task’s unique associations with IU. Finally, the fact that Beads
ask-related distress was not associated with a more general mea-
ure of psychological distress similarly suggests that we specifically
aptured IU-related discomfort. Alternatively, it may  also be that
iven that we had a somewhat restricted and skewed range out of Disorders 41 (2016) 43–49 47
possible scores on the DASS given our non-clinical sample, an asso-
ciation between Beads Task distress and DASS scores was unable to
emerge. Indeed, previous research utilizing a sample of individuals
with anxiety disorders (Jacoby et al., 2014) has demonstrated sig-
nificant associations between uncertainty-related distress during
the Beads Task and DASS scores.
Our finding that perceived distress in response to an uncertain
situation, rather than actual behavioral responses (i.e., DTD and
time), was associated with self-report IU is consistent with previ-
ous work (Jacoby et al., 2014) and may  have clinical implications for
the psychoeducational component of cognitive-behavioral therapy
for anxiety disorders. Specifically, individuals with these conditions
often perceive themselves as “unable” to manage uncertainty; how-
ever, it appears that self-reported IU is not associated with impaired
behavioral performance; rather these individuals appear to be more
distressed by ambiguity. Considering that a complete absence of
uncertainty is impossible, enhancing an individual’s capacity to
cope with uncertainty-related distress seems essential for treat-
ment success (Carleton, 2012). Thus, the Beads Task may  be useful
as a paradigm for assessing the effects of cognitive and behavioral
interventions on IU.
Additionally, future research might take advantage of the Beads
Task as a paradigm to identify predictors of IU-related distress. For
example, individuals with OCD have inflated perceptions of respon-
sibility for harm (Salkovskis et al., 2000), and the Beads Task could
be used to study the effects of responsibility on IU-related distress
by manipulating whether the threat associated with an incorrect
response on the Beads Task (e.g., repeating the CPT) is tied to harm
befalling oneself or someone else. We  are currently studying this
and other such variables in our laboratory to further clarify factors
that contribute to IU. Such work might contribute to the conceptu-
alization and treatment of this transdiagnostic phenomenon.
The Beads Task could also be used to help elucidate the mecha-
nisms by which IU contributes to uncertainty-related distress. For
instance, it may  be that some participants waver between choices
on the Beads Task, request more beads to gain a sense of certainty
over their decision, and struggle with decision paralysis; whereas
others use a more avoidant strategy and make quicker decisions
to escape uncertainty-related distress. Indeed, previous work has
indicated that IU was associated with the tendency to sacrifice
potential reward during a gambling task in order to avoid prolonged
uncertainty-related distress (Luhmann et al., 2011). Similarly, indi-
viduals high in IU, relative to those with low IU, were less likely to
change their decision when presented with an additional response
option when reaching a decision about a high-risk vignette scenario
in another study (Jensen, Kind, Morrison, & Heimberg, 2014). Alter-
ing the Beads Task procedure in similar ways (e.g., introducing an
option to avoid either (a) a prolonged period of uncertainty before
learning the correct answer or (b) re-entering the decision-making
process when additional information is introduced) might address
these questions.
The present study has a number of limitations that should be
considered. First, our sample consisted of unscreened undergradu-
ates and no structured diagnosed interviews were administered.
However, previous research suggests that IU has a dimensional
latent structure, which provides opportunities for studying IU-
related distress in community samples (Carleton, Weeks et al.,
2012). Although the sample’s mean and range on the subscales
of the IUS-12 was  less than that obtained from an intensive out-
patient/residential setting (IUS-prospective: M = 22.55, SD = 7.58;
IUS-inhibitory: M = 16.52, SD = 5.79; Jacoby et al., 2013), scores
were comparable to those from previous studies using undergradu-
ate samples (IUS-prospective: M = 16.68, SD = 6.00; IUS-inhibitory:
M = 9.17, SD = 4.15; Carleton et al., 2007). Nonetheless, future
research is needed to examine these constructs in larger clinical
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Ice Bucket Challenge” (which involved dumping a bucket of ice
ater on one’s head to promote awareness of amyotrophic lateral
clerosis, ALS) was highly publicized at the time this study was
eing conducted. Accordingly, referring to the CPT as a “Cold Water
hallenge” during participant recruitment may  have attracted
ensation-seeking individuals to our study. Finally, despite using a
0:50 random number generator to determine the order of beads in
ach task version, participant decisions on which jar they thought
he beads were coming from disproportionately favored the yel-
ow jar in Version 3. Thus, future research may  wish to prioritize
he other versions in which participant decisions were evenly dis-
ributed.
. Conclusions
In summary, the current study examined relationships between
elf-report IU and performance on an updated version of the Beads
ask. By linking decisions to an aversive future outcome (i.e., the
PT), the enhanced version was designed to increase ecological
alidity of this task as an analog for capturing uncertainty in the
ontext of anxiety disorders. In vivo distress experienced during
he Beads Task was associated with self-report inhibitory IU, which
easures avoidance and paralysis in the face of uncertainty, but
ot with prospective IU, perfectionism, or general psychological
istress (after making statistical adjustments for multiple compar-
sons), suggesting that this task may  be uniquely capturing anxiety
ue to paralysis while attempting to make a decision with no cor-
ect answer. These findings are consistent with previous work that
ne’s emotional response to the Beads Task as opposed to one’s
bserved behavioral responses (i.e., draws to decision and time to
ecision) are most strongly associated with IU and demonstrate
onstruct validity.
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